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Abstract
This paper provides evidence that the European Central Bank (ECB) has adjusted
its interest rate since 1999 nonlinearly according to the macroeconomic and financial
environment in the euro zone. Its policy function is described by a Taylor rule with
regime shifts implying that the stance of reaction to the inflation-gap and output-gap
has varied according to the credit risk in the private and sovereign bond markets,
the monetary base and past levels of inflation, output and the shocks affecting the
European economies. We provide evidence of regimes corresponding to low to high
levels of inflation with the possibility of a situation near a zero low bound (ZLB) for
the interest rate. We study the implications of such a rule for the economy in a simple
new-Keynesian framework and show that it is consistent with several stable long-run
steady states equilibria among which one that is consistent with the recent situation
of a near liquidity trap in the euro area. We also find that around this liquidity trap
steady state the equilibrium is locally determinate for most plausible parameter values.
We discuss the issue of moving from a situation of low nominal interest rate to a policy
that have been more typically implemented in the past by relying on an analysis of the
impact of shocks (supply and demand) to the economy.
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1 Introduction
This paper shows that a regime-shift Taylor rule can be used to model the short-term in-
terest rate in the euro zone from 1999 till 2012. This rule captures monetary regime changes,
in the sense that the European Central Banks (ECB)’s targeted interest rate is character-
ized by important shifts when the monetary authorities worry about the macroeconomic
and financial environment, for instance the occurrence of bubbles, situations of liquidity
trap or increasing risks in some financial market segments. The observed changes in the
short-term interest rate is not only the result of the ECB’s response to deviations from in-
flation and output-targets, but also reflect the time variation in the stance of their response
to macroeconomic and financial conditions.
Our paper relies on two important strands of the literature on monetary policy modelling:
1/ nonlinear interest rate rules and their implications for the macroeconomic equilibrium of
monetary economies, 2/ time-varying Taylor rules.
On the one hand, a literature on Taylor rules find that the latter can display nonlinearities
that create several long-run equilibria for monetary economies.
A key issue is whether several stable equilibria can coexist and whether it is possible for
an economy to start in the neighborhood of an equilibrium and follow eventually a path
yielding to another one. This can happen for instance if there are several long-run steady
states that are locally stables. Such an issue is of particular interest in the current context
of liquidity traps that characterizes the industrialized economies with a situation of zero
low bound (ZLB) since the recent 2008 crisis. One has to worry about the possibility that
the economy becomes permanently trapped in an unintended equilibria, as was the case for
instance in Japan over the 2000s with a deflationary regime and low nominal interest rates.
Whether or not interest rate rules can lead to several equilibria is, however, still highly
controversial. In rational expectation models, ZLB solutions are sometimes considered as
the results of self-fulfilling expectations and are ruled out. This is what is done when one
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linearizes the macroeconomic model in the neighborhood of a desired equilibrium. However,
there are many papers showing that once we consider the true nonlinear models, nonlinear
Taylor rules yields to equilibria including endogenous cycles, bifurcation, chaotic dynamics1,
or simply the coexistence of several stable stationary steady states (see Section 2 below for
a brief review of the literature on this issue).
The purpose of this paper is to examine this issue in the case of the euro area. We find
that since 1999 two stable long-run steady states have co-existed, one of which is consistent
with the current situation of a near liquidity trap. This result is obtained by considering
a nonlinear Taylor rule that replicates the dynamics of the interest rate on the historical
data and a rule that describes the targeted interest rate from a simple Keynesian model.
We discuss the policy implications by examining the impulse response functions of supply
and demand shocks. Since the Taylor rule is not linearized in the neighborhood of a specific
steady state, the economy contains several long-run steady states and the economy can move
away from a desired equilibrium of medium nominal interest rate to an undesired situation
of liquidity trap. More interestingly, we wonder about the size of an inflation or demand
shock that is needed to help the economy leaving a situation of liquidity trap or zero interest
rate policy and return to a normal situation.
The second strand of the literature on which we rely concerns the modelling of time-
varying interest rate rules. This motivates the type of nonlinearity considered for our Taylor
rule. There are several reasons for considering regime-shift dynamics (also called regime-
switching dynamics) in the Taylor rules. Firstly, the economy can be characterized by
structural shifts, thereby implying a time-varying relationship with the interest rate. If
these structural changes are neglected by the monetary authorities small changes in the
interest rate could result in involuntary large effects on output and inflation (see Schorfheide
(2005), Zampolli (2006)). Secondly, the effects of shifts in monetary policy rules can be
a source of widening of the yield spreads (see Ang et al. (2011)). Thirdly, some previous
1See Benhabib et al. (2002b) and Benhabib and Eusepi (2005).
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papers have pointed to sizable empirical differences between Taylor rules with time-varying
coefficients over the conventional constant parameter Taylor rules to describe the ECB’s
monetary policy (see Assenmacher-Wesche (2006), Trecroci and Vassalli (2010)). Our paper
propose a new contribution to this existing literature in several directions.
We explore the possibility of a regime-dependent Taylor rule for the Euro zone by con-
sidering a true ECB nonlinear Taylor rule. Indeed, due to the limitation of the data, many
previous studies either consider a hypothetical ECB rule, by averaging national short-term
interest rates, or by considering ECB linear Taylor rules with constant coefficients (see for in-
stance, Belke and Polleit (2007), Gerdesmeier and Roffia (2004), de Haan et al. (2008), Sauer
and Sturm (2007), Ullrich (2003)). Further, all the previous studies consider a period before
the 2008 crisis. We broader the usual time span by including in the data the years following
the recent Great recession. Another contribution concerns the modelling of the regimes. It
is common wisdom in the papers that have considered regime-switching monetary policy
rules to consider regimes on a pairwise basis. Authors usually distinguish between normal
and exceptional regimes when important events happens, for instance high and low inflation
regimes, regimes of bubbles in the returns and prices as opposed to no bubble regimes (see
Alcidi et al. (2011), Davig and Leeper (2006)). Here, we find that the ECB monetary policy
can sometimes be described by more than two regimes. This illustrates the fact that the
ECB does not only shifts its behavior when exceptional events like a crisis occur. We let the
data determines the number of regimes, because the time-varying coefficients in the Tay-
lor rule can be explained by several factors: shift in the policymakers’ decisions, structural
instabilities in the macroeconomic fundamentals, model uncertainty, etc. In our case, it is
assumed that he following factors cause a shift in the parameters: the ECB’s concern about
providing the economy with a sufficient amount of liquidity, the past level of the EONIA
rate and credit risk in bond markets.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present a brief review
of the literature. In Section 3 we estimate a standard linear Taylor rule for the ECB with
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constant coefficients, which serves as a benchmark model. Section 4 contains the description
and estimations of different regime-shifts Taylor rules. In Section 5, we study the implications
for the economy of such rule in presence of supply and demand shocks. Finally, section 6
concludes.
2 Literature review
Since the seminal paper of Taylor (1993), feedback rules have become so common in
monetary policy discussions and consensual. Central banks of largest developed economies
used such rules to implement monetary policy (see Clarida et al. (1998)). Taylor stressed on
the stabilizing effect of a feedback rule with an inflation coefficient higher than one, which
implies that the monetary authority increases real interest rate whenever inflation increases,
and an important part of the literature argued that such rule would contribute to macroe-
conomic stability since they guarantee the uniqueness of rational expectations equilibrium
while feedback rules with a coefficient lower than one, passive rules, have destabilizing effect
because the equilibrium become indeterminate2.
The advocacy for active monetary policy has been challenged by another strand of the
literature in two ways. On the one hand, it has been shown that the conclusion about
local determinacy depends crucially on the specification of the model. Carlstrom and Fuerst
(2001) shows that in a model in which consumption but not investment purchases are subject
to a transactions constraint there is real indeterminacy if the monetary authority implements
its policy using a forward-looking Taylor rule. Benhabib et al. (2001a) shows that assuming
that consumption and real balances are Edgeworth complements (Ucm > 0) or substitues
((Ucm < 0) is crutial to local determinacy under active policy rule, it also shows that the
standard conclusion about local determincy under active policy rules does not hold when
money enters the production function.
2See Woodford (2003) for more details.
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In Benhabib and Eusepi (2005), the authors considered both local and global analysis.
They introduced capital into a sticky prices monetary model and showed that an active
policy rule may not be enough to guarantee global determinacy. Their main result is that
even when an active rule allow the equilibrium to be locally determined (and the nominal
interest rate affects marginal costs), global equilibria can be indeterminate because of a
possible convergence to a cycle.
On the other hand, the analysis of local dynamics around the targeted steady state denies
implicitly the zero lower bound on nominal interest (ZLB). The figure below plots the Fisher
relation, r+ pi, the nominal interest rate, R, and its lower bound. If the ZLB does not exist,
then monetary authority would react by adjusting the nominal interest rate following the
Taylor rule for any economic condition (the dashed line). When the zero lower bound is
taken into consideration (the thick line), a second steady state arises (the intersection point
between the Taylor rule when hit by the ZLB and the Fisher relation) which necessitate the
analysis of global and not only local dynamics.
pi
R
r + pi
R
Source: Benhabib et al. (2001b)
The seminal paper Benhabib et al. (2001b) is the seminal paper that analyzed the impact
of the ZLB on macroeconomic stability, the important contribution of the paper was to show
that it is possible for the economy to start near the targeted steady state and converge
towards the liquidity trap steady state. After showing in models with both flexible and sticky
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prices that the ZLB implies the existence of a second steady state at which the monetary
policy is passive, authors analyze both local and global equilibria. They start by proving
that the equilibrium is locally determinate around the steady state at which monetary policy
is active and indeterminate around the steady state at which the monetary policy is passive.
Then they considered the global equilibria and showed that for plausible parametrization
there exist an infinite number of equilibrium trajectories originating close to the steady state
at which monetary policy is active that converges to that steady state.
The same authors also show in Benhabib et al. (2002b) that, under certain conditions,
cycles and chaos (nonperiodic deterministic cycles) exist. They consider a flexible prices
model in which the production function depends on real balances and which includes the
ZLB on the nominal interest rate. They show that even when the targeted steady state is
locally the unique equilibrium, cycles of any periodicity and chaos might exist.
One trivial answer to eliminate this multi equilibria problem, regardless of the possibility
of implementing such solution, would be to allow the monetary authority to set negative nom-
inal interest rates since it is due to the ZLB. Interestingly, Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2009)
showed that even under global Taylor rules, equilibrium liquidity traps can still possible.
Authors showed, in a flexible and sticky prices, discrete and continuous time frameworks,
that under certain model specifications a continuum of rational expectations equilibria in
each of which the nominal interest rate converges to zero and the inflation rate to a smaller
rate than the targeted one.
In the spirit of results obtained in Carlstrom and Fuerst (2001) and Benhabib et al.
(2001a) about the different impact of backward and forward-looking Taylor rules on macroe-
conomic stability, Eusepi (2007) used the flexible price of Benhabib et al. (2001a) but backed
off the rational expectations assumptions and assumed that agents can learn over time by
considering the date produced by the economy. The main result of this paper was the
difference between backward and forward-looking Taylor rules on macroeconomic stability.
Eusepi showed that under forward-looking Taylor rule, the economy can still converge to
7
the liquidity trap steady state. But when a the monetary authority implements its policy
through a backward-looking Taylor rule, then the unique learnable equilibrium is the steady
state at which the monetary policy is active.
Benhabib et al. (2001b) did not include an effective policy to avoid such undesired out-
comes, after its publication several authors tried to engineer policies to avoid liquidity traps.
Several policies were suggested to both avoid the economy from falling into a liquidity trap
and allow it to benefit from the positive characteristics of the Taylor rule by preserving it.
The first attempt was in Benhabib et al. (2002a) where the authors built on their previous
paper and suggested both monetary and fiscal policies that would avoid the economy falling
into a liquidity trap. They showed that the economy can avoid such outcome if the govern-
ment threatens to switch fiscal policy by implementing an aggressive enough fiscal stimulus
if the inflation rate becomes lower than a threshold. They also showed that a monetary
policy switch which follows the Taylor rule when inflation is close to the targeted rate and a
money growth rule if it becomes lower can be effective, under the condition that fiscal policy
would be non-Ricardian, in eliminating liquidity traps.
Chattopadhyay and Daniel (2013) stresses on the important relation between inflation
expectations and central bank’s inflation target. The authors suggest a monetary policy
switch where the short run inflation target differs from the long run inflation target, they
show that if the central bank switches from targeting the long run inflation target to a higher
short run inflation target whenever the nominal interest rate becomes lower than a threshold
than such policy would prevent the economy from falling into a liquidity trap under the
condition that such switch would be highly persistent. Such policy would increases inflation
expectations, reduces real interest rate and boost demand enough that the nominal interest
rate would rises.
Policies that would avoid allow the economy to escape from a liquidity trap were also
studied under learning. In Evans et al. (2008), the authors employ a new Keynesian model
based on Benhabib et al. (2001b) but assumed that agents form their expectations using
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an adaptive forecasting rule. They started by showing that the steady state at which the
monetary policy is active is locally stable under learning while the steady state at which the
monetary policy is passive is locally unstable under learning. They also showed that if an
exogenous shock leads to a strong downward revision of expectations relative to the targeted
steady state then paths leading to a deflationary spiral are generated. Then the authors
consider both monetary and fiscal policies that would avoid the economy from falling into a
liquidity trap, but they show that an aggressive monetary policy is not enough to achieve this
goal. They considered a combined aggressive monetary and fiscal policy and show that if the
authorities commit to this policy then the targeted steady state is the unique outcome and
liquidity traps are avoided. This policy relies on switching to an aggressive policy whenever
inflation rate becomes lower than a defined threshold: first, implementing an aggressive
monetary policy; second (if this is not sufficient) using fiscal policy to drive up inflation to
meet the threshold in question. The value of this threshold is crucial. It should be between
the inflation rates consistent with the steady state at which monetary policy is passive and
the inflation rate at which monetary policy is active in order for the policy to be effective.
More recently, in Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2013), the authors write a model which
displays the jobless recovery which characterizes liquidity traps. The main contribution of
the paper is the combination between downward rigidities on wages combined to the ZLB on
the nominal interest rate. In such framework, if inflation expectations are well anchored then
negative shocks on the economy have only temporary impact and recovery is accompanied
by job creation. But a negative confidence shock which affect inflation anchoring and lowers
inflation expectations would result by a growth rate of wages above the full employment
level (because wages are downwardly rigid) and unemployment emerges. This unemployment
depresses demand and puts downward pressure on inflation. Nominal interest rate is then
lowered which signals a decrease in inflation through the Fisher effect. The authors suggest
a policy under which monetary authority pegs nominal interest rate to intended rate3 (the
3Costas Azariasdis and Jess Benhabib argued that such policy would create a pseudo steady state (at
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nominal interest rate consistent with the inflation target), they argue that such policy would
avoid the economy to fall into liquidity traps. The beneficial impact of this policy comes from
allowing real wages to fall as fast as the growth rate of the economy during the transition
period when involuntary unemployment persists. Rigidities on nominal wages implies that
the only way to decrease real wages is to increase inflation and when the central bank raises
the nominal interest rate, it impacts positively inflation through the Fisher effect.
It is now consensual to say that Japanese economy has been in a liquidity trap regime
since late 1990s. Since 2009 this experience was a real concern to policymakers in western
countries. Bullard (2010) argues that assuming the Japanese experience is due to some
cultural or institutional particularities, or that the economy would naturally return to its
natural long-run outcome is denial. He stresses on another form of denial: accepting the
existence of both steady states but pretending that the long-run outcome of the economy
would only be the targeted steady state, because stable dynamics are present only around
it. Even if the global analysis in the literature presented above shows a possible convergence
towards the liquidity trap steady state, Bullard argues that US data present important facts
which would lead to a conclusion that the liquidity trap steady state is locally stable, just like
the targeted steady state (our results argues in favor of such conclusion in the case of the euro
area). He finally criticizes the policies suggested in the literature as unrealistic and argues in
favor of quantitative easing. A major part of the suggested policies is based on implementing
an aggressive fiscal policy whenever inflation expectations are beneath a certain threshold, he
points to the recent European experience as an example of how unpractical such suggestions
are.
In Aruoba and Schorfheide (2013), the authors estimate a New Keynesian DSGE model
using U.S. data and contribute to two strands of the literature. First, they consider the
impact of the ZLB on the fiscal multiplier. They capture, as suggested by this strand of the
the point of discontinuity) and that the economy might oscillate around that point instead of converging to
the intended steady state. See Bullard (2010) for more details.
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literature, that the effect of an increase in government spending when the economy is at the
ZLB can be substantially larger than one but they obtained smaller multipliers than those
found in the literature. They also contribute to the strand of the literature presented in this
section by answering if the U.S. economy fell into a deflation regime after the crisis or not.
They concluded that a short lived switch, when compared to a more persistent one, to the
deflation regime provide more plausible characterizations to the period from 2009 to 2010.
3 Estimating a Taylor rule for the ECB with constant
parameters
We begin with a Taylor rule with constant parameters estimated on ex-post data. The
rule is written as follows:
it = α + βpipit + βyyt + ωzzt +
2∑
j=1
ρjit−j + t (1)
with the following definitions of the variables:
it : nominal interest rate at time t,
α : a constant,
pit: inflation rate at time t,
yt : output-gap at time t,
it−1, it−2 : interest rate smoothing terms reflecting a gradual adjustment of the interest rate,
zt: indicator of bond market risk in the money market at time t,
t : error term which is assumed to be iid(0, σ
2
 ).
The rule links the policy rate to inflation and the output-gap as in many papers. We
add the influence of a third factor reflecting the ECBs concern about financial stability. As
was evidenced in previous empirical papers, central banks mitigate the fallout of financial
busts if they think this is risky for the inflation and output objectives (see Gros and Grauwe
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(2009)). The theoretical motivation for the introduction of a bond market risk variable in
a Taylor rule is the existence of financial frictions as suggested for instance by Curdia and
Woodford (2010).
Equation 1 is the best we succeeded to estimate among several linear specifications,
including forward looking interest rate rules. This equation was selected on the basis of
information criteria (AIC) and specification tests on the residuals. We ran OLS specifications
using monthly data between February 1999 and July 2012. All the series come from the ECB
statistical database.
The EONIA rate is used as a measure of the interest rate. For the inflation rate, we con-
sider the average inflation over two consecutive months computed using the HICP monthly
rate of change and the output gap is defined as the difference between the log of the vol-
umes GDP and the log of the real potential GDP obtained by applying the Hodrick-Prescott
filter to the real GDP series. We use the cubic spline interpolation to transform the quar-
terly GDP series into monthly ones. The credit risk indicator is the bond market sub-index
of ECB’s Composite Indicator of Systemic Stress; this sub-index is an aggregation of the
realized volatility of the German 10-year benchmark government bond index, yield spread
between A-rated non-financial corporations and government bonds (7-year maturity) and
10-year interest rate swap spread. This sub-indexis chosen because it is the best proxy that
contains information on credit risk (through the yield spread between A-rated non-financial
corporations and government bonds) that was publicly available and covering a reasonably
large period of time. The bond market risk indicator is aggregated from daily data by taking
the monthly averages.
The results of the OLS estimation are reported in Table 1, along with some specification
tests on the estimated residuals. For purpose of comparison, we also report the values of the
inflation and of the output-gap obtained in previous studies on Taylor rule estimates for the
euro area, as well as the coefficients of the smoothing parameters (Table 2).
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OLS estimates
Variable Estimation Std-error†
Intercept 0.068226 0.036152∗
p¯it 0.19628 0.088913
∗∗
yt 3.0699 0.92173
∗∗∗
zt -1.4716 0.39007
∗∗∗
it−1 1.2651 0.077259∗∗∗
it−2 -0.27988 0.076576∗∗∗
Autocorrelation tests on the residuals (Ljung-Box)
LB(1) Statistic: 1.04262 p-value: 0.30721
LB(2) Statistic: 7.12202 p-value: 0.02841
BDS Statistic: 1.64 p-value: 0.1
Table 1: Results of the estimation of the linear Taylor rule
†: ***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
When p-value < 0.10, the null iid is rejected. R2 = 0.99, p-value vs constant model < 0.0001.
Authors Inflation coefficient Output-gap coefficient Smoothing coefficient Data and sample
Adema (2004)
1.8 1.72 0.75
Ex-post data
1994 Q1 - 2000 Q4
1.89 0.46 0.64
Real time data
1994 Q1 - 2000 Q4
Cartensen and Calavecehio (2004) 1.01 1.36 0.95
Real time data
1999 M1 - 2004 M2
Gerdesmeier and Roffia (2005)
1.08 0.7 0.84
Ex-post data
1999 M1 - 2003 M6
0.39 2.05 0.63
Real time data
1999 M1 - 2003 M6
1.31 1.95 0.71
Survey data
1999 M1 - 2003 M6
Sauer and Sturm (2007)
-0.84 1.45 0.94
Ex-post data
1999 M1 - 2003 M10
-0.27 3.01 0.98
Real time data
1999 M1 - 2003 M10
6.62 9.24 0.98
Forecast data
1999 M1 - 2003 M10
Goster, Jacobs and De Haan (2008)
0.09 0.37 0.95
Ex-post data
1997 M1 - 2006 M12
1.39 1.52 0.86
Real time data
1997 M1 - 2006 M12
Belke and Klose (2011) [0.17; 2.98] [-0.55; 1.42] [0.53; 0.98]
Real time data
1999 Q1 - 2010 Q2
Table 2: Estimates of the coefficients of inflation rate, the output-gap and the smoothing
parameters in some previous studies (Taylor rules in the euro zone)
Our estimates show that the coefficients are statistically significant and carry the expected
signs, indicating a positive reaction to inflation and the output-gap and a negative reaction
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to the credit risk. The so-called Taylor principle is violated since βpi < 1 and the output-gap
coefficient is high with a value of 3.07 (as in some previous studies of the literature, see
Table 2). A coefficient of the inflation rate below 1 should not necessarily be interpreted
as a source of macroeconomic instability and indeterminacy, as discussed in Section 2. And
the high coefficient on the output-gap does not imply a high preference for the output-
gap, since its captures both the ECBs preferences and the structural determinants of the
economy4. The estimations also show a sluggish adjustment of the interest rate since the
sum of the coefficients ρj,(j=1,2) is near 1. This supports previous findings in the literature
(see Table 2). However, as discussed in Section 4, the interest rate smoothing is not a robust
finding once the nonlinearity of the interest rate rule is accounted for. This means that the
persistence of the interest rate hide a problem of specification.
Table 2 shows that, there is a high dispersion in the estimates of the inflation rate and
output-gap, between ex-post and real time data, and also across real time and ex-post data
themselves when one uses linear Taylor rule to account for the ECBs interest rate rule. Given
the high dispersion of the estimates, it is difficult to form a judgment about the adequacy
of our estimated rule in the sense that different estimates yield different conclusions.
At first sight, Figure 1 suggests that the interest rate estimated by the rule is consistent
with the actual path of policy rates. Indeed, on average the estimated rule seems to overlap
the historical data and the EONIA displays an adjustment towards the Taylor rule.
However, looking at Table 1, the specification tests on the residuals suggest that there
are still some unexplained correlations in the residuals, as shown by the Ljung-Box and
BDS tests. However, the motivations that lead us not to retain this rule for purpose of
policymaking are not statistical. Our point is rather that, from a policy viewpoint, the
linear rule is neither transparent to communicate, nor simple to verify by the private sector.
Transparency and communication are the two pillars which make the Taylor rule a tool for
4The reader can refer to Hayo and Hofman (2006) for a discussion of the interpretation of the output-gap
coefficient in Taylor rules.
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Figure 1: Historical and estimated interest rate (linear rule)
central bank, in the sense that they can anchor inflation expectations by telling the private
agents what they are doing and by sticking to the announced rule. Figure 1 shows that
there has been some changes in the level of EONIA several times and the data suggests
regime switches. For instance, since 2008, the interest rate has decreased at low levels,
which was not the case before the financial crisis. We also observe that the nominal rule
has been kept stable during the years 2002, 2004-2005 and between mid-2007 and mid-2008.
Conversely, significant cuts or increases have been observed at other periods. This suggests
that the changes in the rates have been very incremental during some years, but have been
characterized by rapid switches during other years. The linear specification does not tell us
why. An equation involving multiple regimes for the interest rate would be more informative.
Further, there are no reasons why, subject to the existence of several regimes in the setting
of monetary policy, the reaction of the interest rate to inflation rate, output-gap and credit
risk should remain the same.
The next section presents examples of such rules which adequately describe the dynamics
of the EONIA between 1999 and 2012.
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4 Taylor rules with multiple regimes: examples and
modeling
4.1 Example 1
In the wake of the recent great recession, central banks in the industrialized countries
have turned to the so-called unconventional monetary policies which involved an expansion
of their balance sheet (quantitative easing). Their aim was to influence the market rates
through channels that differ from the classic open-market channel. The expansion of the
ECBs balance sheet was the result of provision of long-term loans in exchange of collateral
(bank loans instead of the usual government bonds). The objective was to alleviate the
raising funding risk in the banking sector. The ECBs policy was designed to set the interest
rate with awareness of what increase in the quantum of monetary base was necessary to
support the euro-area economy5.
Consider the ECBs balance sheet as an advanced indicator of the monetary authorities
preferences for inflation, the output-gap or credit risk. For instance, in a context of weakness
of the economic recovery, an increase in the monetary base can be an indication that the
ECB is willing to give a higher importance to the output-gap objective than in normal times.
In this case, the optimal response of the central bank to changes in the explanatory variables
can be studied using a nonlinear Taylor rule by making the parameter of this rule a function
of the ECBs balance sheet:
it = α(bτ ) + βpi(bτ )pit + βy(bτ )yt + ωz(bτ )zt +
2∑
j=1
ρj(bτ )it−j + t (2)
where bτ is the ECBs balance sheet at time τ . If the central bank seeks to communicate
5Among the numerous papers that have studied the unconventional monetary policy followed by the
ECB, we refer the reader to Giannone et al. (2012), Lenza et al. (2010), Peersman (2011).
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about its policy action using this rule, the latter can be useful to inform the private sector
and the public about two regimes: a normal regime and an exceptional regime. In normal
times, the central bank recur to the interest rate as its policy instrument to stabilize the
inflation rate and the output-gap. However, during some exceptional periods, for instance
the periods following a great recession or a financial crisis, the ECB uses its balance-sheet
as an additional instrument to implement its policy and this in turn affects the response of
the interest rate to the macroeconomic variables. The delimitation between the two regimes
can be captured by a threshold function:
θ(bτ ) =

θ1, if bτ < c: normal regime
θ2, if bτ ≥ c: exceptional regime
(3)
where θ = (α, βpi, βy, ωz, ρ1, ρ2). c is a threshold value of the ECBs balance sheet. The
transition between the regimes in (3) is assumed to be sharp and to be described by an
indicator function:
θj(bτ ) = I(bτ < c)θ
1
j + [1− I(bτ < c)] θ2j (4)
The index j denotes one element of the vector θ. I is the Heaviside function. Smoother
responses can be allowed for by considering a continuous function f :
θj(bτ ) = f(bτ < c)θ
1
j + [1− f(bτ < c)] θ2j (5)
with this formulation, the Taylor rule indicates that the response of monetary policy is
variant across time and regimes.
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4.2 Example 2
In Equations 3, 4, 5, instead of the ECBs balance sheet, we can consider the credit risk
in bond markets, zτ . There are several reasons why this variable causes switches in the
response of the interest rate to the macroeconomic variables.
Firstly, the risk-taking behavior of the banking sector and of investors in bonds markets
drive the business cycle and can be considered as an advanced indicator of future economic
activity. Increased leverages are usually associated with beliefs of forthcoming periods of
prosperity. Conversely, shifts to less risky assets signals a forthcoming vulnerability of the
real activity through a lending channel (credit conditions are characterized by tightening
lending conditions that can be a factor of economic recessions6). This situation can lead the
monetary authorities to react asymmetrically to output-changes depending upon whether
credit risks signal loose or tight credit conditions (by cutting the interest rates in times of
reduced risk, but not reacting in good times when increased risks reflect optimistic behaviors
in the financial markets).
Secondly, risk-taking behaviors in financial markets induce changes in the policy interest
rate through two channels. The direct channel is the liquidity channel. In times of turmoil,
characterized by an increased risk, the ECB must ensure that the markets are not gripped
by illiquidity problems and this leads to a decline of the short-term interest rate. This
reaction is captured by the coefficient ωz in Equation 1. There is also an indirect channel.
Indeed, risk-taking behaviors are a source of bubbles and financial instability. The monetary
authorities take into account these risks if they believe that the latter can have large negative
effects on the economic activity and price stability. In this case, the coefficients βpi and βy in
equation (1) are conditioned by the level of credit risk in the economy. The values of these
coefficients should differ when the observed changes in credit risks signal a forthcoming
financial market slump and when the dynamics of inflation and output-gap are unrelated to
the agents risk-taking behavior in equity and bond markets.
6See Bhattacharya et al. (2011), Lown and Morgan (2006).
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4.3 Example 3
The third example refers to the case of endogenous monetary policy switching as defined
by Davig and Leeper (2006). In this case, instead of bτ in equations (4) and (5), the variable
influencing the reactions of the ECB can be the interest rate itself. The interpretation of
the Taylor rule is accordingly the following. Not only do changes in the economic variables
(inflation, output, risk in the bond markets) drive monetary policy regimes. The latter also
depends upon the ECB’s past time preferences towards these variables. Such a rule is called
a self-exciting Taylor rule and can be useful is the monetary authorities worry about the
Lucas criticism: when the economic environment is modified, the private sector change the
way in which it uses the Taylor rule to make decisions and the central bank in turn reacts
to these changing behaviors by adjusting its own policy.
4.4 Regime-switching Taylor rules for the ECB : estimation and
results
We estimate LSTR (logistic smoothed transition) equations on the EONIA to account
for regime-switching dynamics. They encompass the linear rule as a particular case7. The
estimated rule is as follows:
it = x
′
tβ1 +
M∑
m=2
x
′
tβmf(lt, γm, cm) + t (6)
where
f(lt, γm, cm) =
1
1 + exp(−γm(lt − cm)) (7)
7This class of models was proposed in the early 1990s. For details, the reader can refer to v. Dijk et al.
(2002), v. Dijk et al. (2002), Hillebrand et al. (2012). For application to monetary policy modeling, we refer
the reader to Alcidi et al. (2011), Dufrenot et al. (2004), Jawadi and Sousa (2013).
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lt is the transition variable that determines which regime is activated, γm is the speed param-
eter of regime m, it allows comparison of how fast transition occurs when having multiple
non-linear regimes, cm is the threshold of the transition variable that identifies the transi-
tion for the non-linear regime m and x
′
t = (1 pit yt zt it−1 it−2) contains the variables defined
above. It is clear that f(lt, γm, cm)→ 1 when lt →∞ and f(lt, γm, cm)→ 0 when lt → −∞
which is why lt is called the transition variable and how a continuous transition between
regimes is introduced by LSTR models.
The choice of the transition variables rely on the arguments provided before in our three
examples. However, the assumptions according to which the lagged values of the interest rate,
the ECBs balance sheet and credit risk contain information to be considered as advanced
indicators of the changing reactions of the interest rate in the Taylor rule need to be tested
formally. To begin with, F-test type are applied to test the null hypothesis of linear Taylor
rule against alternative LSTR specifications with two regimes. Then, if the null is rejected,
additional nonlinearity tests are done by testing n against alternative n+1 nonlinear regimes.
Once the assumption of linear Taylor rule is rejected against the alternatives of LSTR
specifications, we then estimate nonlinear Taylor rule. For technical details about the testing
and estimation methodology, the reader can refer to the references in footnote 7. To the
extent that these methodologies are now widespread in the applied literature, we skip their
presentation in this paper. We simply notice two points. Firstly, as is usually the case,
the Fisher test is based on a third-order expansion of the logistic function to overcome the
known problem of nuisance parameter. Secondly, the estimation of the model is based on
the maximum likelihood estimator.
Table 3 contains the results of the linearity tests. In the first column, we report the
number of regimes tested under the alternative hypothesis. Columns 2 till 4 contains the
p-values (significance level) of the Fisher tests. The assumption of a linear Taylor rule should
be rejected at the 5% or 10% level of significance if the reported values lie below 0.05 or 0.1.
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When the transition variables are the ECBs balance-sheet and the credit risk variables, the
tests concludes to a two-regime model, while a three-regimes model seems to be adequate
when the lagged interest rate is considered as the transition variable.
Tables 4, 5 and 6 report the estimations and some tests on the estimated residuals. We
first give general comments on the main implications from the estimations and then we
discuss in deeper details the different regressions.
Transition variables
Number of regimes it−1 ut zt
2 regime <0.001 <0.001 0.017
3 regimes 0.05 0.21 0.29
4 regimes 0.8
Table 3: P-values of the non linearity tests of a linear Taylor rule against regime-shift Taylor
rules
Linear coefficients (L) Non linear coefficients (NL1) Non linear coefficients (NL1)
Estimate Std-Error Estimate Std-Error Estimate Std-Error
Intercept 0.2271 0.0764∗∗∗ -0.0859 0.1273 1.0867 0.6474∗∗
p¯it -0.0250 0.1473 0.3557 0.1845
∗∗ -0.5036 0.2586
yt 3.6175 1.3264
∗∗∗ 0.1700 1.8253 -1.7146 3.9949
zt -2.6715 0.7393 1.8470 1.0279
∗∗ -4.0803 1.7756
it−1 0.8871 0.1681∗∗∗ 0.5202 0.1945∗∗∗ -0.6802 0.2305
it−2 0.0322 0.1539 -0.4901 0.1801 0.5362 0.1932∗∗∗
γ 50 0∗∗∗ 30 0∗∗∗
c 2.2048 0∗∗∗ 4.0644 0∗∗∗
Specification tests on the residuals:
LB(1) = 1.3918 p-value: 0.2381
LB(2) = 4.4794 p-value: 0.1064
BDS test = 2.921 p-value: 0.00348
Table 4: Estimation of the nonlinear Taylor rule with the interest rate as the trasition
variable
†: ***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. When p-value < 0.10, the null
of iid is rejected.
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Linear coefficients (L) Nonlinear coefficients (NL)
Estimate Std-Error Estimate Std-Error
Intercept 0.0807 0.049∗ 0.082 0.0962
p¯it -0.046 0.1054 0.244 0.1898
yt 1.733 1.0507
∗ 3.641 1.9716∗∗
zt 0.514 0.7933 -2.339 1.3511
it−1 1.207 0.0829∗∗∗ -0.405 0.1911
it−2 -0.235 0.0830 0.305 0.1832∗∗
γ 50 81.241
c 1.442 0.0372∗∗∗
Specification tests on the residuals:
LB(1) = 1.0204 p-value: 0.3124
LB(2) = 11.5673 p-value: 0.00308
BDS test = 0.3631 p-value: 0.7164
Table 5: Estimation of the nonlinear Taylor rule with ECB’s balance sheet as the trasition
variable
†: ***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. When p-value < 0.10, the null
of iid is rejected.
Linear coefficients (L) Nonlinear coefficients (NL)
Estimate Std-Error Estimate Std-Error
Intercept 0.0836 0.0443∗∗ -0.0628 0.1644
p¯it -0.1640 0.1216 0.6899 0.1904
∗∗∗
yt 2.6352 1.0860
∗∗∗ -1.5276 2.2913
zt -0.0058 0.7147 -1.6887 1.6150
it−1 1.1559 0.0986∗∗∗ 0.1960 0.1950
it−2 -0.1709 0.0974 -0.1909 0.1908
γ 50 82.2702
c 0.6933 0.0407∗∗∗
Specification tests on the residuals:
LB(1) = 0.23696 p-value: 0.6264
LB(2) = 4.81006 p-value: 0.0902
BDS test = 1.5043 significance level: 0.1324
Table 6: Estimation of the nonlinear Taylor rule with the bond market risk as the trasition
variable
†: ***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. When p-value < 0.10, the null
of iid is rejected.
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4.4.1 Switches in the interest rate and threshold values
Figure 2, which plots the EONIA rate and the estimated thresholds, shows three regimes
in the ECB policy. The first regime begins in mid-2000 and ends by the end of the year 2001;
it coincides with the Dot-Com bubble bust. Financial disruption that occurred in the euro
area during this period explains the high rate regime. The low rate regime is triggered after
the beginning of the financial crisis at the end of 2008 which confirms the concern of the ECB
about reaching its policy rate effective lower bound. The third regime can be interpreted as
a normal regime when the euro area is not facing major economic disruptions.
Figure 2: EONIA rate, in percent, and the estimated thresholds
As mentioned above, after the crisis policy rates reached and got stuck at their effective
lower bounds in many economies. Like many central banks, the ECB reacted by using its
balance sheet as a new instrument to implement its monetary policy. This use makes the
ECB’s balance sheet a suitable candidate to detect any regime switch motivated by the
concern of interest rate hitting the effective lower bound. By looking at Figure 3 one can
identify the timing of regime change which coincides with the beginning of the financial
crisis. It is interesting to note here that using the lagged interest rate (Figure 2) or the
ECB’s balance sheet (Figure 3) predict both the same timing of switch in monetary regimes
motivated by the ECB’s concern about interest rate hitting the effective lower bound.
Figure 4 plots the variable zt and the estimated threshold related to it. As mentioned
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Figure 3: ECB’s total assets and the estimated threshold
before, this indicator aggregates several economic features. One should be cautious when
interpreting regime switches related to it because it contains information about financial
health and lending in the economy but also information related to the European sovereign
debt crisis. Only periods starting from mid-2007 to mid-2009 and from mid-2011 to the
beginning of 2012 will be interpreted here since there is relatively no ambiguity about their
inferred regime and they allow discussing both information stated above that are included
in the indicator. On the one hand, in mid-2007 financial stress was a significant concern
to the ECB and relatively stable situation on the sovereign debt market argue in favor of
considering that the financial stress is the information contained in the bond market risk
indicator that counts in this period. On the other hand, as pointed out in Eser et al. (2012),
the negative development of the sovereign debt crisis in mid-2011 was ECB’s major concern
during the second period pointed out above. One can argue that information about sovereign
debt has more importance during this period.
As a whole, it can be concluded from the different figures that the ECB has switched
policy regimes after the beginning of the crisis. Indeed, the estimated thresholds for all
transitions variables, despite differences between the economic information that they contain,
show a switch in policy regimes after the beginning of the recent financial crisis. We would
also like to stress that the results from using the bond risk indicator as the transition variable
show that the ECB has changed its monetary regime to answer the concern of a rise in credit
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Figure 4: ECB’s bond market risk indicator and the estimated threshold
spreads.
4.4.2 Regime-shifts in the EONIA when lagged interest rate is the transition
variable
To write the nonlinear Taylor rule corresponding to the estimations in Table 4, we need
to re-parametrize the model. This yields the following three-regime rule:
it =

0.23− 0.02pit + 3.62yt − 2.67zt + 0.88it−1 + 0.03it−2, if it−1 < 2.2
0.15 + 0.33pit + 3.78yt − 0.83zt + 1.4it−1 − 0.46it−2, if 2.2 < it−1 ≤ 4.06
1.23− 0.17pit + 2.07yt − 4.91zt + 0.72it−1 + 0.08it−2, if it−1 > 4.06
(8)
The estimated equation manages to identify three regimes of respectively, low, medium and
high interest rates. The first regime corresponds is identified when the interest rate crosses
a threshold value of 2.2%. We have seen, in Figure 2, that this corresponds to a situation
when the interest rate fell near a zero low bound (ZLB). In this regime, the ECB disregards
the inflation objective (very low coefficient) but responds to output fluctuation and bond
market risk. In this regime, the interest rate is very sluggish in comparison with the other
two regimes. The third regime can be interpreted as one in which the ECB consider the
economy in danger of facing a credit risk, thereby implying a strong cut in the interest
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rate (the coefficient is 4.91 for zt, much higher than for the other two regimes). In the
intermediate regime, the ECB seems to pay a lower attention to the bond market risk (the
smallest coefficient for zt is obtained for this regime) but focuses on its traditional goal,
namely a trade-off between inflation and output stabilization.
4.4.3 Regime-shifts in the EONIA, ECB’s balance sheet and bond market risk
Using the estimates in Tables 5 and 6, we obtain the following nonlinear Taylor rules,
respectively when the ECBs balance sheet and the bond market risk are used as the transition
variables:
it =

0.08− 0.05pit + 1.73yt + 0.51zt + 1.22it−1 − 0.24it−2, if ECBt < 14400
1.16 + 0.2pit + 5.3yt − 1.8zt + 0.08it−1 + 0.07it−2, if ECBt ≥ 14400
(9)
it =

0.08− 0.16pit + 2.63yt − 0.006zt + 1.16it−1 − 0.17it−2, if zt < 0.07
0.02 + 0.52pit + 1.15yt − 1.68zt + 1.34it−1 − 0.36it−2, if zt ≥ 0.07
(10)
The first rule tells us that the ECB can manage the size of its balance sheet and use the
interest rate to implement its monetary policy. The threshold can be considered as a quan-
titative target which serves as a benchmark to determine the conditions in which the central
bank reacts to changes in the macroeconomic and financial environment. As we noticed in
Figure 3, the second regime (ECBt ≥ 14400) coincides with the timing of a low interest rate
policy. In this regime, the interest rate adjusts freely to achieve monetary policy objectives
(the sum of the autoregressive terms is only 0.15) and that is in sharp contrast with what
happens in the other regime where the sum of the autoregressive terms is near 1. This calls
for cautious about the interpretation of the equation in this regime. When monetary policy
takes place in a context of large balance sheet (ECBt ≥ 14400), the observed movements
of the interest rate in reaction to inflation, output or credit risk is not necessarily the result
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of a discretionary interest rate policy. Rather, the estimated equation distinguishes between
a regime of active Taylor rule (ECBt < 14400) and inactive Taylor rule (ECBt ≥ 14400).
One reason is that, there are several interest rates: the lending rate, the deposit rate, the
targeted rate which is here the EONIA. When the central bank has no quantitative objective
(the balance sheet remains below a given level), the targeted rate is the main objective of the
monetary policy and money supply is adjusted to achieve it, in regard to the macroeconomic
determinants of the demand for reserves (inflation, output, liquidity). In the other regime,
the central bank searches to activate other transmission channels than the standard interest
rate channel to the activity. For this reason, it uses other tools (credit easing, quantitative
easing or the interest rate paid on reserves). In the case of the ECB, the excess reserves
held on banks accounts at the central bank do not earn any interest. For this reason in the
second regime, the interest rate moves freely.
The second rule says that the ECB is concerned with the effects of a higher or lower
risk on the economy (for instance a possible deflationary and depressing effects of a higher
liquidity risk) and that it adapts its policy accordingly. Specifically a higher attention is paid
to the risk when it increases (as suggested by the higher coefficient of -1.68 in the second
regime which is much higher than 0.006 in the first regime) and the central bank would
tend to intervene more strongly to smooth changes in inflation.
5 Macroeconomic implications of nonlinear Taylor
rules
What are the implications of the nonlinear Taylor rules for macroeconomic policymaking?
There is a rapidly growing literature on this topic. Studies suggest that nonlinear interest
rate rules give rise to multiple macroeconomic equilibria in monetary economies (seminal
papers are Benhabib et al. (2001b), Benhabib et al. (2002a)). A central point of the discus-
sion is whether all the equilibria are desirable outcomes and whether they are meaningful.
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Until now, the policy responses are diverse. A typical undesirable outcome is for instance
a situation of low nominal interest steady state with a large basin of attraction yielding for
instance to a long situation of deflationary spiral as was observed in Japan (see Bullard
(2010) for a discussion). Some authors consider that in general the co-existence of several
locally stable steady states is not a desirable result and propose to make some assumptions
to obtain only one stable steady state. For instance the introduction of a learning process
can yield the agents to choose the good equilibrium (see, Evans et al. (2008)). It is also
possible to eliminate equilibria like liquidity trap, by introducing an expansive fiscal policy
(Benhabib et al. (2002a), Eggertsson and Woodford (2004)). An important strand of the
literature also points to the meaning of multiplicity, specifically when nonlinear Taylor rule
explain the existence of endogenous cycles in monetary economies (see Airaudo et al. (2012),
Benhabib et al. (2002b), Eusepi (2007)).
To study some of the implications of the nonlinear Taylor rules for the euro area monetary
economy, we proceed by doing a simple exercise aiming at showing several features. We
consider the rule estimated when the lagged interest rate is the transition variable. Firstly,
there are several macroeconomic equilibria, among which two steady-states. One corresponds
to a situation of a near liquidity trap and the other to a normal situation with an intermediate
level of the nominal interest rate. This is shown by considering the framework of a simple
Keynesian model. Secondly, we worry about the issue of moving from one equilibrium to
the other. It is important to know under which circumstances the European economy is
trapped in an undesired outcome (for us a situation of ZLB8) or whether shocks that are
of an important size can help to avoid the equilibrium. We consider two types of shocks,
supply and demand, and compare their respective ability in driving the economy towards an
equilibrium or the other.
8In such situation, the conventional monetary policy loses its ability to react to negative shocks and the
financial system’s health might be endangered because many financial contracts are stated in nominal terms.
See Bullard (2010) for a further discussion.
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5.1 Nonlinear interest rate rule and multiple macroeconomic equi-
libria
As is seen from our estimation, the Taylor principle is always violated. This raises
issues about the possibility of multiple equilibria if the Taylor rules are embedded into a
macroeconomic model. The literature has extensively discussed one aspect of the multiplicity
of equilibrium, namely the fact that sunspot equilibria exist and are not ruled out when there
is no credibility that the central banks reaction to different shocks will be strong enough to
make the agents coordinate their expectations to one fundamental equilibrium. We do not
discuss this here. Another implication of the violation of the Taylor principle is the possibility
of several fundamental equilibria when the economy can switch between several stable steady
states defined in different regimes.
To illustrate this, we consider a simple model that consists of a Fisher equation and the
nonlinear Taylor rule in which the lagged interest rate is the transition variable. This rule
is taken for purpose of illustration and a similar analysis could be done by considering the
other two rules in Section 4.
5.1.1 Derivation of the optimal interest rate
The Fisher equation is not considered in an ad-hoc manner, but derived from the inter-
pretation of a new-Keynesian model9. Assume that the central bank minimizes the following
intertemporal loss function:
Et
+∞∑
τ=t
βτ−tV (pit, yt, zt),
where V (pit, yt, zt) =
1
2
[
λ1(pit − pi∗t )2 + λ2(yt − y∗t )2 + λ3(zt − z∗t )2
] (11)
where pit, yt, zt are respectively the inflation rate, the output-gap and the ECBs bond risk
9For a similar interpretation, see Barnea and Liviatan (2011), Cochrane (2011), Walsh (2010).
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indicator. A star indicate the targeted values of these variables. Et denotes the expectation
taken at time t and 0 < β < 1 is the discount factor.
We also consider an augmented Phillips curve with forward looking expectations:
pit = Etpit+1 + κ1yt + κ2zt + ut (12)
ut is a stochastic supply shock and κ1 captures the degree of price stickiness.
We further introduce the following (IS) curve:
yt = Etyt+1 − σ(it − Etpit+1 − rt) + vt (13)
it is the nominal interest rate and rt the Wicksellian natural rate of interest defined as the
real interest rate consistent with full employment in the absence of demand shocks. vt is a
stochastic demand shock and σ represents the intertemporal elasticity of substitution.
Equations (12) and (13) have been extensively discussed in the literature and are derived
from micro-based macroeconomic models with representative agents adopting intertemporal
decisions and setting prices la Calvo (see, for instance Woodford (2003)).
To obtain the first-order conditions (FOC) with respect to the inflation rate, the output-
gap and the bond-risk, we write the Lagrangian:
L =
+∞∑
τ=t
βτ−tV (pit, yt, zt) +
+∞∑
τ=t
φτ [piτ − Eτpiτ+1 − κ1yτ − κ2zτ − uτ ] (14)
φτ is a Lagrangian multiplier. We rewrite the Lagrangian as follows:
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L =
+∞∑
τ=t
βτ−tV (pit, yt, zt) +
s−2∑
τ=t
φτ [piτ − Eτpiτ+1 − κ1yτ − κ2zτ − uτ ]
+φs−1 [pis−1 − Es−1pis − κ1ys−1 − κ2zs−1 − us−1] + φs [pis − Espis+1 − κ1ys − κ2zs − us]
+
+∞∑
τ=s+1
φτ [piτ − Eτpiτ+1 − κ1yτ − κ2zτ − uτ ]
(15)
The FOC are the following:
w.r.t. pis : β
s−tλ1(pis − pi∗)− φs + φs−1
w.r.t. ys : β
s−tλ2ys − φsκ1
w.r.t. zs : β
s−tλ3(zs − z∗)− φsκ2
(16)
The combination of these three equations yields the following equality:
pit − pi∗ = −1
λ1(κ1 + κ2)
[
λ2
β
(yt−1 − y∗)− λ2(yt − y∗) + λ3
β
(zt−1 − z∗)
]
λ3
λ1(κ1 + κ2)
(zt − z∗)
(17)
Solving for it in the (IS) equation yields:
it = σ
−1 [Etyt+1 − yt] + Etpit+1 + rt − σ−1vt (18)
At steady state vt = 0, Etyt+1 = yt and we assume that the ECB reaches its targets. We
thus have
it = Etpit+1 + rt (19)
This equation is a modified Fisher equation stating that, at the steady state, the nominal
interest rate equals the real interest rate (wickesellian natural rate) plus expected inflation.
At the steady state, the optimal real interest rate should equal the Wicksellian real natural
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interest rate. This gives a path of the interest rate the monetary authorities should set if
they search to minimize the intertemporal loss function (11) subject to the macroeconomic
constraints represented by the IS and Phillips curves. The macroeconomic equilibrium is
obtained by crossing this relationship with the Taylor rule followed by the central bank.
From (17) if β → 1, (19) implies
it = rt + pi
∗ (20)
Thus, when the discount rate tends to 1, the existence of several steady states due to
the regime-switching dynamics of the interest rate can be interpreted as a consequence of
switches in the long-run natural rate and or as a consequence of switches in the ECBs
inflation target.
5.1.2 Macroeconomic equilibria
In Figure 6, we plot the regime-switching Taylor rule when the lagged interest rate is
considered as the transition variable (red curve) and a Fisher equation estimated for each of
the three regimes (blue curve). Both curves relates the inflation rate to the EONIA. In the
Fisher equation, we have taken the real interest rate to be constant. A typical characteristic
of our nonlinear Taylor rule is the discontinuity of the red curve due to the presence of
switches between the different regimes. The two curves cross at three points representing
a macroeconomic equilibrium in each regime. This is the interest rate corresponding to an
optimum at the steady state: if there are no shocks, the monetary authorities do no longer
wish to cut or raise the interest rate.
The first equilibrium corresponds to the point (1%;-0.2%) that is a situation of negative
yearly inflation rate around 2.4% and a low nominal interest rate. This illustrates a context
of near liquidity trap (the interest rate is small, but not zero) in an environment of deflation.
At the other extreme we have a situation of high interest rate with a high interest rate, since
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the two lines cross at the point (4.8%; 0.5%): the interest rate is set at a high level to cope
with an average yearly inflation of 6%. Finally, there is a third equilibrium corresponding
to an intermediate level of the interest rate (3.1%) and where the inflation rate reaches
a monthly level of 0.2% (that is on average 2.4% per year). As a conclusion, there are
potentially three targeted interest rate corresponding to the different regimes. An important
question concerns the stability of these equilibria: can one expects the economy to remain
for a long time at these equilibria if small disturbances occur near the steady states.
The stability properties can be studied by comparing the slopes of the Taylor rule and
of the fisher relation at the different steady states. Formally, we consider the following
relationships within each regime j:
it = a
j
1Etpit+1 + b
j
1 + u
j
t and it = θ
j
0 + θ
j
1pit + θ
j
2yt + θ
j
3zt + v
j
t (21)
This yields the following equation for the inflation rate:
pit = pi0
(
θj1
aj1
)t
+
t∑
j=1
(
θj1
aj1
)j−1
xt−j +
t−1∑
j=0
(
θj1
aj1
)j−1
δt−j (22)
where xt =
θj0−bj1
aj1
+
θj2
aj1
yt +
θj3
aj1
zt. δt is a stochastic noise with a zero mean and a finite variance
(which combines the supply and demand shocks and the error-term of the inflation rate
rational expectation). The solutions of this equation are locally non-explosive if θj1 < a
j
1.
Using the different estimates, we obtain the following conclusions10:
The ECB regime-switching Taylor rule thus rules out hyperinflationary solutions, but any of
the other two steady state equilibria are possible: low and intermediate interest rates. The
first equilibrium corresponding to a situation of low interest is not necessarily undesirable at
present time, because the steady state interest rate is still not at zero and could accordingly
be changed to accommodate any further negative shocks in the euro area (cutting the interest
10We do not discuss here the issue of sunspots equilibria which may exist within each regime.
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Fisher equation Taylor rule
Conclusion
aj1 θ
j
1
Regime 1
0.49 0.22 Locally stable
it−1 ≤ 2.2
Regime 2
1.63 0.84 Locally stable
2.2 < it−1 ≤ 4.06
Regime 3
0.65 0.81 Explosive
it−1 > 4.06
rate can be proved effective until the zero low bound is reached). In the current context of
a moderate deflation in the euro area, this equilibrium is at least as desirable as the other
locally steady state.
However, the monetary authorities in Europe hold onto the belief that this situation
should be transitory and their objective for the medium term is to reach the steady state
that was prevailing before the financial crisis, which corresponds here to the steady state
with moderate inflation. Moreover, like other central bankers, the ECB would like to avoid a
situation in which the euro area would undergo a deflationary trap as was observed in Japan
over the last decade. So, although, the equilibrium with a low interest rate may be desirable
for the moment, the authorities are interested by shocks that may move the economy to
the second stable steady state. Theoretically, this issue refers to global determinacy and
has been discussed extensively in the literature (see the references at the beginning of this
section). We focus the discussion here on the policy implications for our case. For this
purpose, we conduct different experiments by examining the impulse response functions of
the inflation rate, output-gap and inflation rate to supply and demand shocks.
5.2 Shocks and regime-switching equilibria
We now turn to a different exercise. To gain some insight into the dynamic proper-
ties of our nonlinear Taylor rules, we conduct impulse response analysis and analyze local
equilibria in each regime. The model considered here consists of three simple equations: a
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demand curve, a Phillips curve and the nonlinear rule with the interest rate as the transition
variable11:
yt = Etyt+1 − σ−1(it − Etpit+1 − gt) (23)
pit = βEtpit+1 + κyt + ut (24)
it = θ
j
0 + θ
j
pipit + θ
j
yyt + ρ
j
1it−1 + ρ
j
1it−2 (25)
Where j represents the regime at time t, σ the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, β the
discount factor and κ the degree of price stickiness12. The output-gap and inflation shocks
follow autoregressive processes:
gt = ρggt−1 + 
g
t (26)
ut = ρuut−1 + ut (27)
gt and 
u
t are random noise variables drawn on normal distributions N(0, 1), σg and σu are
the standard errors of the noises. The economy can receive adverse or positive shocks (in
this case, the signs of the shocks are respectively negative and positive).
5.2.1 Local dynamics
The aim here is to verify local determinacy13 when the monetary policy takes the form
of the estimated Taylor rule in each regime presented above. Given the uncertainty about
the parameters14 β, σ and κ15 we study the local determinacy for each combination on the
following regions: β ∈ (0.98, 0.9975), σ ∈ (1, 3.5) and κ ∈ (0.025, 0.525).
11For purpose of simplicity, we consider the standard IS curve without the Wicksellian interest rate.
12As explained in Woodford (2003), κ = (1−α)(1−αβ)α
ω+σ−1
1+ωθ where α is the fraction of goods prices that
remain unchanged each period, ω is the firms marginal cost with respect to its own output and θ is the price
elasticity of demand of the goods produced by monopolistic firms.
13For more details on local determinacy analysis, see appendix.
14See Ahmed et al. (2012), King et al. (1988) and Rotemberg and Woodford (1999) for more details.
15For simplification reasons we give a reasonable range of variation instead of varying the fundamental
parameters which defines it.
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Local determinacy is impacted by values of both β and κ but not those of σ. We find that
the equilibrium is always determinate in the intermediate rates regime and figures 5 present
regions where the equilibrium is determinate in the liquidity trap and high rates regimes,
respectively.
Right figure in 5 shows that for most reliable parameters (κ < 0.3), the equilibrium in
the liquidity trap regime is determinate, while the domain where the equilibrium in the high
rates regime is much less important. Most of the theoretical literature (Benhabib et al.
(2001b), Benhabib et al. (2002b), Benhabib et al. (2002a)...) present an unstable liquidity
trap steady state and analyze global equilibria and how sunspot equilibria might lead the
economy to a liquidity trap. Our findings (as argued in Bullard (2010)) suggest that liquidity
trap equilibria can, as the targeted equilibria, be locally determinate for most of plausible
parameters values.
0.98 0.985 0.99 0.995
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
(a) Liquidity trap regime
0.98 0.985 0.99 0.995
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
(b) High rates regime
Figure 5: Determinate equilibrium (blue area)
X-axis: β Y-Axis: κ
5.2.2 Demand and supply shocks
To conduct impulse response analysis, we use the standard calibration (see Davig and
Leeper (2006)) as follows: β = 0.99, ρg = ρu = 0.9 and κ = 0.18. Our simulations are based
on regime-dependent impulse response functions: generalized impulse response functions
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(GIRF). We first solve the system of rational expectation equations and then we use the
solution with backward dynamics to simulate the model. Local equilibria is determinate
around steady states in both liquidity trap and normal but indeterminate around the steady
state in the high rates regime.
GIRFs rather than standard IRF are considered because the moving average represen-
tation of the solution is not linear in the shocks, because the endogenous variables are
conditional on the regimes visited during the entire past history as well as on the sign and
direction and the shocks.
The standard impulse response function, for a variable y, which is mostly used in the
literature is defined as the difference between two realizations identical up to t− 1, the first
realization yt+n is hit by a shock Vt = δ at t while the second realization assumes that there
is no shocks on y between t and t+n. We follow Koop et al. (1996) and define the standard
impulse response function as:
IY (n, δ, ϕt−1) = E [Yt+n|Vt = δ, Vt+1 = 0, ..., Vt+n = 0, ϕt−1]−E [Yt+n|Vt = 0, Vt+1 = 0, ..., Vt+n = 0, ϕt−1]
(28)
As noted in Koop et al. (1996), the standard impulse response functions depend on the
history ϕt−1 and the size of the shock δ for nonlinear models; asymmetries might also arise
in these cases. Since we are considering here the nonlinear policy rule, the standard impulse
response function is not adapted to our analysis. We compute the Generalized Impulse
Response Functions (GIRF) defined as:
GIRFY (n, δ
′, ϕt−1) = E [Yt+n|Vt = δ′, ϕt−1]− E [Yt+n|ϕt−1] (29)
The GIRF is the difference between two conditional realizations, one that is shocked and the
other without the shock. The purpose of our analysis is to analyze how the economy reacts
to demand and supply shocks.
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For each size δ′, we generate 1000 shocks from N(0, σ2δ′), simulate the model and compute
the corresponding GIRF for each shock then we average out to obtain the final GIRF. We
repeat this process 1000 times and obtain a distribution for each response at every timing
t + j where j = 124 and responses of each variable at t + j are computed as the median of
each distribution and presented in the following figures.
We assumed the economy to be initially in the low or intermediate rates regimes
(it−1 ≤ 2.20 and 2.20 < i(t−1 ≤ 4.06) since the high rates regime presents indeterminacy
(see appendix for more details). In both cases (low or intermediate rates regimes) we choose
three different sizes of shocks, namely small, medium and large size. In the sequel, we employ
the expression liquidity trap to characterize the low interest rate regime (though the latter
is not strictly zero) and normal regime when the latter is in the intermediate regime.
Figures 7 and 8 display the response of the output-gap, inflation and interest rate to
demand and supply shocks conditional on initially being in a regime of liquidity trap (low
interest rate) or intermediate rate regime. The dashed lines represent the response corre-
sponding to negative shocks, while the solid lines plot the responses of the positive shocks.
The variables remains in the initial regime when there is a feedback dynamics, after the
initial shock, to the zero line. They switch from one regime to the other when there is no
such mean-reverting dynamics to the zero line and when we instead observe that the GIRFs
converges to a value above or below the zero line. The shocks considered here are policy
shocks. We assume that they are persistent in the sense that the public does not expect
them to be reverted too quickly. Such an assumption is worth to avoid that the shocks
become neutral on the economy (or equivalently that the policy become ineffective). Indeed,
one needs to keep in mind that the effects of the shocks are channeled to the macroeconomic
variables through the publics expectations.
Figure 7 reports the response of inflation, the interest rate and the output-gap to different
standard deviation positive and negative supply shocks. Figure 8 displays similar responses
to demand shocks.
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With regards to the question on how to make an economy move from a situation of
liquidity trap to a normal regime, the simulations yield to conclusions that are in line with
those of the recent theoretical studies. Assume that the economy is initially in a liquidity
trap regime. What is needed to leave this regime is a policy of reflation, which is obtained
by positive supply and demand shocks (expansive monetary policy, deficit spending, tax
increases). The figures show that large enough expansionary demand and supply shocks
cause the interest rate and the inflation rate to switch to the intermediate regime. However,
the impact on the output-gap is ambiguous. The dynamics results from two effects. On the
one hand, large expansionary and inflationary shocks imply that the private sector anticipates
higher future interest rates, when the economy will have left the liquidity trap regime. By
forwarding the (IS) curve:
yt = Etyt+1 − σ−1
T∑
s=t
Et(is − pis+1 − gs) (30)
we see that the output-gap depends upon the expected path for future interest rate and a
similar dependent relationship applies to the Phillips curve by substituting (30) for yt in
(24). People thus expects a lower interest rate which stimulates aggregate demand and raise
the inflation rate.
On the other hand, owing to the switching Taylor rule, the ECB reacts to changes in
the aggregate and inflation rate. In the rule estimated, the ECB seems is more reactive to
changes in the output-gap than to inflation. As a consequence the positive effects induced
by the expectation channeled can be countered by the increase in the interest rate by the
ECB that resultsfrom the Taylor rule. Since the central bank is very reactive to changes in
the output-gap, the total changes on this variable can eventually be null. In this case, the
economy moves from a regime of liquidity trap with deflationary pressures to a regime of
stagflation (with a higher inflation rate, but unchanged output-gap). Figure 8 suggests that,
during the adjustment dynamics towards the long-run equilibrium, the output-gap can even
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become negative over some periods. Therefore, if the ECB follows the Taylor rule that we
estimated, expansionary demand shocks and inflationary supply shocks can induce a switch
between two undesired equilibria (liquidity trap and stagflation). The reason is the following.
The public anticipates that, once the deflationary pressures usually observed in a situation
of liquidity trap are subsided and higher levels of output-gap are obtained, the central bank
will turn to a restrictive policy by raising the interest rate.
Conversely, the interest rate and inflation switch from a normal regime to a liquidity trap
regime in case of large recessionary demand shocks or large deflationary shocks. Assume that
the economy evolves initially in the intermediate regime and that large negative shocks hit
the economy. As shown by the graph this causes a drop in both the inflation rate and the
interest rate and a regime-shift for both variables. In addition, we see that this time the
impact of the shocks on the output is non-neutral. The ECB would like to cut aggressively
the interest rate to offset the negative shocks. However, once the economy reaches the
liquidity trap regime, the nominal interest rate is bounded below by zero. In other terms,
the interest rate that would be required to avoid the recessionary effects on the output-gap
would be negative but that is not possible because of the zero low bound. As a consequence,
the economy combines a situation of deflation and recession.
The size of the negative shocks causing a switch from a normal regime to a regime of
low interest rate is lower than the size of the positive shocks implying a switch from a low
interest rate regime to an intermediate regime. Therefore, it is more demanding from a
policy viewpoint to leave a situation of liquidity trap than to make the economy stay in the
intermediate regime after a severe recession.
Needless to say that a situation in which a central bank faces a trade-off between a
situation of recession/deflation and a situation of stagflation is not desirable. This suggest
that, specifically, in times of crises the ECB could change its policy instrument.
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6 Conclusion
There are several proposals in the literature to avoid the economy a situation of liquidity
trap. Benhabib et al. (2002a) and Evans et al. (2008) suggest a combination of both ag-
gressive monetary and fiscal policies. Some economists suggest the use of regime-switching
Taylor rules whereby the central banks changes the inflation target and allows it to tem-
porary deviate from its fixed long-run target (see, for instance Chattopadhyay and Daniel
(2013)). Others propose a permanent monetary expansion (Auerbach and Obstfeld (2005)),
a depreciation of the exchange rate (Svensson (2004)) or pegging the nominal interest rate
(Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2013)). This paper adopts the approach of a regime-switching
monetary rule and examines the case of the ECB. We find that, undoubtedly, the stance of
the reaction to the inflation rate and to output-gap has changed across time and this can be
captured by a regime-switching dynamics. Moreover the ECB also seems to pay attention
to financial risk variables.
One caveat of this rule is its macroeconomic implications. In an uncertain environment,
whereby the European economies are hit by positive and negative demand shocks, it seems
that the euro area might face a persistent liquidity trap regime as suggested by Bullard
(2010). We suggest that the ECB authorities, owing the current situation of low interest
rate, could refer to other monetary policies to exit the liquidity trap situation as suggested
above.
7 Appendix
7.1 Local stability of the demand-supply model
The planner dynamic system16 can be written in the form:
16The system without taking into account the equations describing the evolution of the exogenous stochas-
tic processes.
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Etzt+1 = Azt + a
where the vector of endogenous variables is: 
zt =
yt
pit
it−1
it−2
and the matrices of coefficients are:
A =
1 + σ−1(θy + κ/β) σ−1(θpi − β−1) σ−1ρ1 σ−1ρ2
−κ/β β−1 0 0
θy θpi ρ1 ρ2
0 0 1 0
and 
a =
σ−1θ0
0
0
0
The matrix A has the characteristic equation:
P (λ) = det(A− Iλ) =
−[[(1 + σ−1(θy + κ/)− λ)(−1−λ)
+
σ−1κ
β
(θpi − β−1)]((ρ1 − λ)λ+ ρ2)− (θpiκ
β
+ θy(β
−1 − λ))σ−1(ρ1λ+ ρ2)]
= 0
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Our system contains two non-predetermined variables (y and pi). Conditions in Blanchard
and Kahn (1980) state that for our system to be have a unique solution, there should be
two eigenvalues outside the unite circle. Analyzing in each regime how many eigenvalues are
outside the unit circle allow us to conclude if the equilibrium is determinate or not. We now
take calibrations used to compute the GIRFs as an examlple to better illustrate this. The
following table presents the eigenvalues of A in each regime: We notice that there is exactly
Low rates Intermediate rates High rates
5.533 6.0433 3.8274
1.0043 1.022 0.9795
0.1841 0.153 + 0.2275 i 0.2582
-0.0296 0.153 - 0.2275 i -0.0834
two eigenvalues outside the unit circle in both low and intermediate rates regimes while only
one eigenvalue is outside the unit circle in the high rates regime. Then equilibriums in low
and intermediate rates regimes are determinate, but this is not the case in the high rates
regime where sunspot equilibria might arise.
7.2 Figures
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Figure 6: Nonlinear Taylor rule and Fisher equation
Blue curve: Fisher model - Red curve: nonlinear Taylor rule
X-axis: interest rate Y-Axis: inflation
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(a) Response of inflation (liquidity trap regime) (b) Response of inflation (intermediate regime)
(c) Response of interest rate (liquidity trap regime) (d) Response of interest rate (intermediate regime)
(e) Response of output-gap (liquidity trap regime) (f) Response of output-gap (intermediate regime)
Figure 7: Responses to positive and negative supply shocks
Initial position (left: regime of liquidity trap; right: intermediate regime)
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(a) Response of inflation (liquidity trap regime) (b) Response of inflation (intermediate regime)
(c) Response of interest rate (liquidity trap regime) (d) Response of interest rate (intermediate regime)
(e) Response of output-gap (liquidity trap regime) (f) Response of output-gap (intermediate regime)
Figure 8: Responses to positive and negative demand shocks
Initial position (left: regime of liquidity trap; right: intermediate regime)
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